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GENERAL NOTES 
In this brief, appellant Marvin Montoya uses the same terminology as he did in his 
opening brief on appeal. Hence, Marvin Montoya is called "Marvin", and Susan Montoya 
or Olson is called "Susan" throughout this brief. 
All references to the record or transcript in Marvin's opening brief on appeal, 
henceforth called the "Opening Brief', were to Volumes I of the record and transcript. 
Volumes II of that record and transcript were filed with this court incident to Susan's cross- 
appeal, which was filed three days after the Opening Brief was filed with this court. 
Compare Appellant's Brief, p. 33 with Susan's Notice of Cross-Appeal, R., Vol. II, pp. 41- 
In addition, Marvin notes the two sentences starting on the second line of page 32 
of the Opening Brief should read as follows: 
Her argument overlooks the express, undisputed testimony that the income to, and 
expenses paid by, Montoya Enterprises are shown on Marvin's personal tax returns. 
T., p. 77, L. 9 - p. 179, L. 20. Thus, any money paid to Montoya Enterprises as 
opposed to Montoya himself ultimately showed up on Marvin's tax returns anyway. 
Counsel apologizes for the clerical errors that necessitated this correction. 
Finally, undersigned counsel also acknowledges, and apologizes for, the error in 
Section I of his argument on pages 22 and 23 of the Opening Brief. Susan is correct that 
the authority relied upon in that section of Marvin's brief has been overturned by Losser v. 
Bradstreet, 145 ldaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008). The District Court's decision is now the 
proper focus of this appeal. Reisenauer v. Sfate Dep'f of Transportation, 145 Idaho 948, 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The reversal by Idaho's Supreme Court of the long-standing precedent regarding 
the focus of this court's review requires a refocus of Marvin's analysis. 
In his findings of fact, the Magistrate found that the building at issue was owned by 
Montoya Enterprises. R., Vol. I, p. 42. In his memorandum decision, the District Court 
concluded that the building was Marvin's property. R., Vol. I, pp. 68, 69, 70, and 71. That 
conclusion appears, in fact to have permeated the entire analysis of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In her trial testimony, Susan stated that the building at issue belonged to Marvin. 
Tr., Vol. I, p. 29, LL. 7-9. Susan sought to confirm that testimony through Fernando Veloz, 
the comptroller for MS Administrative Services, but was consistently rebuffed by Veloz' 
testimony that the building was owned by Montoya Enterprises. Tr., Vol. I, p. 162, LL. 2- 
16; p. 167, L. 19 through p. 168, L. 2. Douglas Roberts, a self-employed C.P A. who 
prepared the tax returns for Marvin and his companies, testified at length as to why 
Montoya Enterprises ratherthan Marvin owned the building. Tr., Vol. I, p. 181, L. 9 through 
p. 182, L. 21. 
In her motion for costs and attorney fees filed on January 29, 2008, after the entry 
by the District Court of his memorandum decision, R., Vol. ll, pp. 13-19, Susan offered no 
admissible evidence, but instead only unsupported claims that she did not have the 
resources necessary to pay her attorney fees. R., Vol. II, p. 17. Marvin objected to the 
unsupported allegations, R., Vol. 11, p. 23, and testified to variousvacations taken by Susan 
since the trial of the action, the home improvements that she had made since the trial, and 
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her purchase of a Harley-Davidson motorcycle. R., Voi. i t ,  pp. 28-30. Susan replied in an 
affidavit in which she disputed one of the three vacations to which Marvin had testified, 
asserted that her home improvements were given to her and claimed that she was assisted 
in the purchase of the motorcycle by her father. She provided however, no specifics as to 
the extent of that assistance, R., Vol. II, pp. 32-36, and no corroborating evidence in 
support of any of her claims. 
When the motion for fees was argued to the Magistrate, Susan argued that she was 
entitled to fees on account of her "inadequate child support", Tr., Vol. 11, p. 10, LL. 2-5, a 
motion for contempt that she had filed and a motion for modification filed by Marvin, Tr., 
Vol. 11, p. 12, LL. 22-25, and the disparity of income and assets of the parties. Tr., Vol. 11, 
p. 14, LL. 17-25. Marvin renewed his objection to the unsupported allegations, Tr., Vol. II, 
p. 19, LL. 20-25, and pointed out (1) that Susan had not provided a budget of her income 
and expenses, Tr., Vol. 11, p. 20, LL. 1-8, and (2) that Susan's home improvements and 
purchase of the motorcycle contradicted her claims that she had no money to pay her 
attorney fees. Tr., Vol. 11, p. 20, LL. 13-23. Susan then tried, in argument, to rebut 
Marvin's affidavit testimony. Tr., Vol. II, p. 22, L. 2 through p. 24, L. 15. 
The Magistrate found that the disparity of income alleged by Susan was not 
sufficient to trigger an award of attorney fees. Tr., Vol. 11, p. 24, L. 22 through p. 25, L.2. 
The Magistrate also pointed out that there was nothing in the record to change his original 
analysis regarding the relative income of the parties. Tr., Vol. It, p. 25, L. 3 through p. 26, 
L. 5. He concluded with some comments regarding the amount of attorney fees alleged 
by Susan in her pleadings, remarking that she was responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
debts that she had incurred. Tr., Vol. 11, p. 27, LL. 3-4. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Given the change in focus mandated by Reisenauer v. State Dep't of 
Transportation, supra, Marvin restates the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Did the District Court err in concluding that the building at issue was owned 
by Marvin? 
2. Did the District Court err in its conclusion that the Magistrate had not 
analyzed the extent to which the rent was a necessary and reasonable business expense? 
3. Did the District Court err in remanding for further consideration of the issue 
of attorney fees? 
4. Did the Magistrate err in denying the motion for attorney fees filed 
immediately after entry of the District Court's memorandum decision? 
5. Is Marvin entitled to his attorney fees incurred on appeal to the District Court 
and to this court under ldaho Code Section 12-121 and Rule 41 of the ldaho Appellate 
Rules? 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Erred in Characterizing the 
Building at Issue as Marvin's Property. 
At trial, Fernando Veloz, the comptroller for MS Administrative Services testified at 
least three times that Montoya Enterprises was, in fact, the owner of the property involved 
in this appeal. Tr., Vol. I, p. 112, LL. 4 - 22; p. 162, LL. 2-16; p. 167, L. 19 through p. 168, 
L. 2. Douglas Roberts, Marvin's C.P.A. and tax accountant, testified to the reasons why 
this was so. Tr., Vol. I, p. 181, LL. 9 through p. 182, L. 21. While Susan disputed this 
testimony with the unsubstantiated claim that Marvin owned the building, Tr., Vol. I, p. 29, 
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LL. 7-9, the Magistrate concluded that the building was owned by Montoya Enterprises. 
R., Voi. I, p. 42. 
In her appeal to the District Court, Susan made claims like that in her brief to this 
court that it was an undisputed fact that Marvin owned the office building. 
RespondentlCross-Appellant's Brief (henceforth called "Susan's Brief'), p. 76. See also 
Susan's Brief, p. 18 (describing the building as "Marvin's property") and p. 19 (stating the 
office building to be owned by Marvin). These claims were apparently sufficient to 
persuade the District Court that the building belonged to Marvin. See the District Court's 
Memorandum Decision, R., Vol. I, pp. 68, 69, 70 and 71. However, findings of fact by a 
magistrate sitting as a trial judge are not to be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. 
I.R.C.P. 52(a). A district court, in making an appellate review of a magistrate's decision, 
should perform that task in the same manner as the ldaho Supreme Court performs its 
appellate review of trial decisions by a district court. Therefore, when sitting in its appellate 
capacity, a district court should adhere to the rule that findings based upon substantial and 
competent, although conflicting, evidence will not be set aside on appeal. Hawkins v. 
Hawkins, 99 ldaho 785, P.2d 532 (1978). See Ball v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 140 
ldaho 334, 92 P.3d 1081 (2004). Evidence is substantial and competent if a reasonable 
trier of fact could accept it and rely upon it. C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 
ldaho 140, 75 P.3d 194 (2003). 
Hence, when a district court sits as an appellate court for purposes of reviewing a 
magistrate's judgment, it is required to determine whether there is substantial evidence to 
support the magistrate's findings of fact. If the magistrate's findings are so supported, the 
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district court is required to affirm those findings. See Henfges v. Henenfges, I 1  5 ldaho 192, 
P. 2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1988). 
That rule follows from a myriad of appellate decisions to the effect that it is province 
of the trier of fact to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses. E.g., Hopper v. Hopper, 144 ldaho 624, 167 P. 3d 761 (2007). An 
appellate court does not weigh evidence or consider whether it would have reached a 
different conclusion from the evidence. Lopez v. Sfafe, 136 ldaho 174, 30 P.3d 952 
(2001). Accordingly, appellate courts are not permitted to substitute their own view of the 
evidence for that of the trial court, or to make any determinations regarding credibility. 
Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 ldaho 882, 173 P.3d 1141 (2007). 
In this case, the Magistrate found that the building at issue was owned by Montoya 
Enterprises. That finding was supported by the testimony of two accountants, which was 
competent and substantial evidence. The Magistrate did not fail to consider Susan's 
evidence to the contrary. Instead, he simply rejected Susan's evidence in favor of that of 
Marvin, Fernando Veloz and Douglas Roberts. R., Vol. I, p. 43. That was the Magistrate's 
prerogative, and the District Court erred in ignoring all of the rules cited in this brief and 
failing to honor his finding. This court should rule accordingly by reversing the conclusion 
of the district court that the building was Marvin's property, 
11. The District Court Erred in Concluding That the Magistrate 
Had Not Analyzed the Extent to Which the Rent at Issue 
Was a Necessary and Reasonable Business Expense. 
In his findings of fact, the Magistrate stated: 
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During the parties' marriage, they discussed Susan having a 
significant role in the operation of the insurance business. The real property 
on which [Montoya Enterprises] later constructed the office building was 
purchased several years prior to the initiation of this divorce action. 
Construction of the office building was completed in the late summer or early 
fall of 2005, approximately six months prior to this divorce action being filed. 
The court is persuaded that monies generated by [MST Insurance Agency, 
Inc.] and [MS Administrative], from which commissions were previously paid 
to Marvin, are required to be paid to Montoya Enterprises as rent which, in 
turn, service the mortgage and maintenance costs of operating an office 
building that did not exist in prior years. Thus, the court does not find merit 
in the argument that Marvin, individually or through his entities, has 
deliberately invested assets and formed entities to conceal income. 
R., p. 43. The first sentence of these findings is supported by Marvin's testimony that 
Susan had committed to a plan by which she would have joined his company as its CEO 
and headed up a new human resources department, more than doubling the size of the 
company on that account. Tr., Vol. I, p. 68, LL. 10-19; p. 104, LL. 7-15. Marvin's testimony 
was corroborated by FernandoVeloz. Tr., Vol. I, p. 127, L. 25 through p. 131, L. 4. Susan 
admitted these discussions, although she tried to minimize them. Tr., Vol. I, p. 48, L. 11 
through p. 49, L. 5. 
The second quoted sentence of the Magistrate's findings is supported by testimony 
from Veloz and Roberts that the purchase of the land and construction of the building 
occurred three years before the trial, or in 2003. Tr., Vol. I, p. 128, LL. 4-18; p. 182, LL. 
14-21. Susan initiated this divorce action in February of 2006. R., Vol., I, pp. 12-15 
The third of the quoted sentences of the Magistrate's findings is supported by 
testimony from Veloz that Marvin's companies took possession of the finished building in 
June of 2005, when the construction loan was converted into a term loan. Tr., Vol. I ,  p. 
132, LL. 22 through p. 133, L. 11. This was corroborated by Marvin's testimony that he 
had made the investments of capital to construct the building contemplated for the new 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 7 
business venture before being blind-sided by Susan's complaint for divorce. Tr., Vol. I, p. 
68, LL. 10-25; p. 104, LL. 7-15 
The fourth sentence of the quoted findings by the Magistrate is supported by 
testimony from Veloz that the income received by MST Insurance Agency and MS 
Administrative had to be paid to Montoya Enterprises to service the mortgage debt. Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 126, L. 6 through p. 127, L. 7; p. 127, LL. 8 - 17; p. 133, L. 25 through p. 135, L. 
11; p.136, L. 15 through p. 137, L. 13; p. 152, L. 17 through p. 154, L. 2. Increasing 
Marvin's salary or draws, he testified, would deprive the companies of the means of paying 
the mortgage debt and would bankrupt the companies. Tr., Vol. I, p. 139, L. 21 through 
p. 140,L.20;p. 143, LL. 14-24;p.  170,L. 15throughp. 171, L .9  
Based on those findings, each of which is supported by substantial and competent 
evidence, the Magistrate rejected Susan's argument that Marvin's companies or the 
building were intended simply a means of avoiding income. R., Vol. I, p. 43 
The District Court criticized the Magistrate's analysis in the following terms: 
What is missing from the trial court's analysis below is an evaluation 
of whether the new level of occupancy expense - $20,000.00 per month 
instead of the much lower figure - was a "necessary and reasonable' 
business expense to impose on the business. To the extent that the amount 
was not reasonable and necessary to the generation of income from the 
business entities, then the excess amount was money that was gong to 
enhance the husband's separate property interests. In connection with child 
support calculations, this excess would appear to equate to "rent" from 
separate property interests, and should be included in the calculation of 
husband's resources for child support purposes even though it might appear 
that the money was being applied to the mortgage debt. 
R., Vol. I, p. 70. This paragraph is wrong for a variety of reasons. First, if the Magistrate 
did not make a more complete analysis of the extent to which the rental expense paid to 
Montoya Enterprises was unreasonable, the fault was Susan's, because she offered no 
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evidence by which the Magistrate could possibly have made that evaluation. The 
Magistrate directly addressed this issue in his findings: 
Susan attempted to impeach the evidence and testimony offered by 
Marvin and his two accountants but did not offer independent evidence. The 
best evidence in the record regarding the. . . reasonableness of the ordinary 
and necessarv expenses of the entities was offered bv Marvin, and Messrs. 
Veloz and ~ o b e r k .  
R., Vol. I, p. 43. While Susan's brief is long on complaints about the Magistrate's findings, 
it is short on any analysis of evidence thatwould support the District Court's criticism of the 
Magistrate's analysis or permit the Magistrate to make any findings of the nature suggested 
by the District Court in its memorandum decision. 
Marvin defies Susan to point to any evidence in the record that any specific 
percentage or portion of the $20,000 per month paid by Montoya Enterprises to service the 
mortgage and maintain the building was unreasonably charged to that company. She 
cannot meet that challenge for a number of reasons. 
First, Susan offered no evidence to support the proposition that the method followed 
by Marvin and his accountants in structuring the ownership of the building and the flow of 
cash or income was unreasonable or that it distorted the income received by Marvin as a 
result of the organization of his businesses. The only evidence on point was that from 
Marvin's C.P.A. to the effect that the structure of the businesses and ownership of the 
property had no effect whatsoever on the income received by Marvin. Tr., Voi. I, p. 181, 
LL. 9 -  16. 
Second, Susan offered no evidence regarding the adequacy of the facilities 
occupied by Marvin's companies prior to the move. There is nothing in the record that 
indicates whetherthe old space was too big, too small or just right. There is nothing in the 
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record to indicate that the old space was brand new, dilapidated or somewhere in between. 
While Susan did prove that Marvin's companies paid $6,500 per month for the old space 
as opposed to $20,000 per month for the new building, Tr., p. 127, LL. 18 - 22, no one can 
tell whether the difference between $6,500 and $20,000 is due to inadequacies in the old 
space or unreasonable accommodations in the new. Susan offered no evidence regarding 
(1) the amount of space occupied by Marvin's companies in the old facility as compared 
with that occupied by them in the new facility or (2) the reasons for any difference between 
those numbers, whatever they may have been. 
Moreover, to compare the cost of the old space with the cost of the new space is, 
in any event, an unreasonable comparison in view of the Magistrate's findings quoted 
above. The new building had not existed at the time that the older space had been 
occupied. Moreover, Susan herself was at least partially responsible for the fact and size 
of the investment that necessitated the substantial payments for servicing the mortgage. 
After Marvin had constructed a building intended to house businesses twice the size of 
MST Insurance Agency and MS Administrative on the assumption of an ongoing marital 
and business relationship with Susan, Susan can hardly complain that, in the few months 
after her filing for divorce, Marvin had not leased out the portions of the building that he 
was unable to use. 
Third, the District Court's observation that Marvin's companies were paying the 
entire occupancy expense of the building, because the remaining space had not been 
rented out, R., Vol. I, p. 69, was certainly true when Montoya Enterprises first took 
possession of the building. Tr., Vol. I, p. 132, L. 22 through p. 133, L. 19. As noted above, 
this was roughly six months before the filing by Susan of her complaint for divorce. R., Vol. 
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I, p. 43. By the time of trial, however, Montoya Enterprises had leased out portions of the 
building. Tr., Vol. I, p. 122, LL. 9-19. Susan, however, failed to prove the amount of rent 
collected by Montoya Enterprises from the tenants other than Marvin's companies. For 
that reason, no one can tell from the record how much of the rent collected by Montoya 
Enterprises was paid by Marvin's companies (MST Insurance Agency and MS 
Administrative), as opposed to the other tenants in the building. 
For all of the reasons listed above, there is no basis in the record for deciding how 
much of the rent paid by Marvin's companies prior to trial was disproportionate to their pro- 
rata obligations for rent, whether measured by the percentage of space that they occupied 
in the building, time of occupancy or otherwise. The reason why there is no such evidence 
is that Susan tried her case on the theory that none of the rent in excess of the $6,500 paid 
per month for the old space was a legitimate business expense. That was the issue 
decided by the Magistrate in his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. R., Vol. 
I, p. 43. That is, in fact, the theory argued in Susan's Brief. See pages 16 through I 9  of 
that document. Susan has never argued or tried to prove to the Magistrate that only some 
portion of the rent in excess of the $6,500 per month paid for the old space was not 
properly chargeable as a business expense. Instead, she has made the issue an "all or 
nothing" proposition by claiming that entire amount of the additional rent was a subterfuge 
adopted one month after the divorce was filed as a means of reducing Marvin's income 
and therefore his liability for child support. See page 19 of Susan's Brief. 
On appeal, parties are held to the theory upon which they tried the case to the lower 
court. Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 124 P.3d 993 (2005). Accordingly, appellate 
court review is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented at the 
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trial level. Nelson v. Nelson, 144 ldaho 710, 170 P.3d 375 (2007); Obenchain v. McAlvain 
Const., Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 137 P.3d 443 (2006). 
The District Court's decision did not address the all or nothing issue tried by Susan 
before the Magistrate. Instead, the District Court "discovered" a new theory, i.e., that some 
portion, but not all, of the difference between $6,500 per month paid for the old space and 
$20,000 per month paid for the new building was not properly charged as an expense to 
Marvin's companies, and gave Susan a fresh start predicated on that new theory. 
However, that decision was not one of the options legitimately presented to the District 
Court by Susan's appeal. Instead, by virtue of the authority cited above, the District Court's 
choices were limited to affirming or reversing the Magistrate's decision on the all or nothing 
case presented by Susan to him. The District Court committed errorwhen he reversed the 
Magistrate's decision on a theory that Susan had never argued to the Magistrate and in 
support of which she had offered no evidence whatsoever. This court should rule 
accordingly by reversing the District Court's decision and reinstating the Magistrate's 
original judgment. 
The propriety of that conclusion is further demonstrated by the arguments offered 
in Susan's Brief, which are nothing more than either unsupported accusations that the 
Magistrate did not do his job or excesses of rhetoric that are unsupported by the evidence. 
One claim illustrating both of these alternatives is the allegation on page 16 of 
Susan's Brief that it is "undisputed" that Marvin personally owned the building. The viability 
of this proposition has already been discredited. See pages 5 through 7, supra. 
Another example of Susan simply second-guessing the Magistrate appears in the 
claim on page 17 of Susan's Brief that January of 2006, was the first time that rent was 
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collected by Montoya Enterprises from Marvin's other companies. In fact, the testimony 
cited in support of that proposition, Tr., Vol. I, p. 168, LL. 21 - 23, takes Fernando Veloz' 
testimony out of context. The entire passage reads as follows: 
Q. Through - - for a period of January through July of 2006, there is a net 
income to Montoya Enterprises, LLC, of 19,958.45? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that's after the - - all the debts have been serviced; correct? 
A. This is after the rental income is taken into account for Montoya Enterprises 
and the operating expenses have been paid out. So, this is a net rental 
income. 
Q. When - - at what point in time did - - let me ask it a different way. Was 
January 2006 the first time that the rent was applied in this fashion? 
A. Yes, it was. Let me - - can I back up, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q. Go ahead and rephrase that question as far as "applied," when you say 
"applied." 
Q. Prior to January 1 *'of 2006, how was the debt being paid on the building, the 
2.2 million plus dollar loan? 
A. Okay. That answers that question. It was being paid - - paid through rent 
from MS Administrative Services. 
Tr., Vol. I, p. 168, L. 10 through p. 169, L. 8. It is obvious from the context that Veloz had 
misunderstood the question in giving the testimony cited by Susan in her brief and that he 
then corrected his testimony, thus eliminating the inconsistency claimed by Susan on page 
17 of her brief. The Magistrate had the option of deciding which version of the testimony 
he would accept. He clearly accepted the corrected version, which was consistent with the 
evidence from Veloz that Montoya Enterprises began charging rent for the facility in June 
of 2005, when its obligation on the debt incurred for constructing the building was finalized. 
R., Vol. I, p. 131, L. 22 through 135, L. I I. Susan's argument to the contrary is merely an 
invitation to this court to reverse the Magistrate's findings, which were predicated on 
substantial and competent evidence contrary to the position that she argued at trial 
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The claim on page 17 of Susan's Brief that Marvin received commission income 
through the entire year of 2005 simply re-argues the conflicting evidence presented to the 
Magistrate by ignoring the fact that Marvin's income in 2005 is part of what Susan herself 
described as the "historical" data, Tr., Vol. I, p. 27, LL. 13 - 18, the fact that Marvin's 
income in 2005 did not guarantee similar income in 2006, Tr., Vol. I, p. 88, LL. 18 - 24, the 
fact that Susan did not file for divorce until February of 2006, R., Vol. I, p. 12, and the fact 
of the undisputed reduction in Marvin's income in 2006, due to lost clientele, R., Vol. I, p. 
42; Tr., Vol. I, p. 77, L. 23 through p. 79, L. 14; p. 137, L. 14 through p. 138, L. 15, and to 
increased expenses related to the building. R., Vol. I, p. 42 - 43; Tr., Vol. I, p. 126, L. 12 
through p. 127, L. 24. Douglas Roberts testified that, if Marvin's business income stayed 
the same, while his business expenses increased, Marvin's net income would decrease 
Tr., Vol. I . ,  p. 179, LL. 4 - 20. The situation would obviously beworse if income went down, 
while expenses went up, which is exactly the situation described by Montoya in his 
testimony. Tr., Vol. I, p. 108, L. 25 through p. 109, L. 2. 
A further example of Susan's second-guessing the Magistrate lies in the further 
claim on page 17 of Susan's Brief that Marvin never explained the source of his 
commission income and that the Magistrate therefore did not perform a careful review. In 
fact, the factual claim that Marvin never answered the question is simply false. Compare 
Tr., Vol. I, p. 135, LL. 12-14 with Tr., Vol. I, p. 183, L. 24 through p. 184, 1. 17. The 
transcript referenced in the latter citation reads: 
Q: And as I understand it now, the $165,296 figure, we can trace that back into 
the tax return on Statement 9, can we not? That's shown as "Insurance 
Sales" on Statement 9? 
A: Statement 9. Yes. 
Q: Okay. Picked up as insurance sales commissions? 
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A: Well, it - - it's labeled "Insurance Sales" because that's how the Schedule C 
is labeled, and this is showing the amount of income that's being 
contemplated for Schedule SE which is for self-employment tax and that 
would be the net profit from Schedule C, yes. 
Q: Okay. I'm with you on that. 
A: Okay. 
Q: Some of these insurance companies, though, are reporting income to Marvin 
on 1099s. So, you had to look at that. You had to combine that 1099 to him, 
personally, together with the pass-through income in order to get the total? 
A: That's correct. 
The $165,296 referenced in the quoted testimony corresponds exactly to the $165,296 
claimed by Susan in the footnote on page 17 of her brief not to have been accounted for 
by Marvin. This renders hollow Susan's claim that, because Marvin failed to answer the 
Magistrate's question, the Magistrate could not perform a careful review. The Magistrate 
undoubtedly made a careful review of the entire record before preparing his findings; 
Susan should do the same before complaining that the Magistrate committed error. 
Afinal example of over-wrought rhetoric that finds no support in the record appears 
on page 19 of Susan's Brief in the following passage: 
Prior to MST and MS occupying the office building owned by Marvin, the 
entities paid rent each month of, according to Mr. Veloz, approximately $6,000. . . 
One month after the divorce is filed, voila!, the entities begin paying rent of $20,000 
per month. 
The claim that Marvin owned the building has already been discredited. See pages 5 
through 7 supra. What is new in this passage is that Marvin the rental expense claimed 
by him did not start until March of 2006, one month after the filing by Susan of her 
complaint for divorce in February of 2006. R., Vol I, p. 12. There is no cite in the record 
for this proposition, and Marvin challenges Susan to provide it in either her closing brief of 
her oral argument. She cannot meet that challenge, because the claim is simply false. 
The closest the record comes to this proposition is the testimony, already discussed, see 
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pages 14 and 15 supra, given by Fernando Veloz under a misunderstanding of the 
question before him. Even that mistaken testimony was to the effect that the rental 
expense started one month before Susan filed her claim for divorce. See also Susan's 
Brief, p. 17. Accordingly, it is no wonder that the Magistrate did not reach the conclusion 
argued by Susan on page 19 of her brief. 
The District Court committed error by concluding that the Magistrate had not 
analyzed the evidence before him. In fact, Susan never presented to the Magistrate the 
issue that the District Court concluded that the Magistrate had not analyzed. Susan, 
however, should be held to the theories and evidence that she originally presented to the 
Magistrate for his decision. The arguments advanced in Susan's Brief in support of her 
position simply rehash the evidence that was rejected by the Magistrate or have no basis 
whatsoever in the record. This court should rule accordingly by reversing the decision of 
the District Court and reinstating the judgment entered by the Magistrate. 
Ill. The District Court Committed Error by Remanding for 
a Further Evaluation of the Issue of Attorney Fees. 
The District Court's order to the effect that the Magistrate could re-evaluate Susan's 
claim for attorney fees upon remand was obviously predicated upon his conclusion that the 
Magistrate's findings of fact regarding Marvin's income were incomplete. If the decision 
of the District Court is itself overturned as a result of this appeal, there is no reason for the 
Magistrate to reconsider the issue of attorney fees. Therefore, incident to reversing the 
decision of the District Court, this court should also reinstate the Magistrate's findings and 
conclusions regarding attorney fees. 
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IV. The Magistrate Did Not Err in Denying Susan's Renewed Motion 
for Attorney Fees filed after the Decision of the District Court. 
Susan's argument that the Magistrate abused his discretion in refusing to award her 
attorney fees after the entry of the decision by the District Court assumes the accuracy of 
Exhibit 52A, which she claims to have established Marvin's net worth at $3.8 million. 
Susan's Brief, p. 28. This evidence was presented and argued at trial, Tr., Vol. I, p. 29, L. 
10 through p. 30, L. 6, and was disputed by Marvin at that time. Tr., Vol. I, p. 67, L. 7 
through p. 70, L. 22. Marvin offered Exhibit 223 into evidence, Tr., Vol. I ,  p. 108, LL. 5 - 
21, which showed a new worth of $1,975,900. Tr., Vol. I, p. 75, LL. 5 - 7. Marvin also 
testified at some length to the reasons for the discrepancy between the two figures. Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 75, L. 8 through 76, L. 22. He later testified that his net worth was, based upon 
an appraisal of his company performed after the preparation of Exhibit 223, only 
$1,400,000. Tr., Vol. I, p. 95, LL. 16 - 21. 
In fact, there are several other reasons to question the validity of Exhibit 52A. It was 
prepared in August of 2005, Tr., Vol. I, p. 29, LL. 17 - 18, before Susan filed her complaint 
for divorce. On its face, the document makes clear that it includes Susan's income in 
addition to Marvin's. See Exhibit 52A, p. 1. It is a fair inference that it includes Susan's 
assets as well. The amount of those assets received by her prior to trial was discussed by 
both sides, without any clear resolution as to exactly what she had received. Tr., Voi. I, p. 
36, L. 21 through p. 39, L. 16; p. 50, LL. 4 - 13; p. 82, L. 20 through p. 83, L. 23. 
However, the critical facts in analyzing Susan's claim for attorney fees are her 
undisputed income of $93,000, Tr., Vol. I, p. 33, LL. 14 - 18, and her responsibility, as 
pointed out by the Magistrate, for a substantial portion of the attorney fees that she had 
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incurred by means of her aggressive litigation tactics and "unkind and uncivil allegations" 
against Marvin in the trial proceedings. R., Vol. I, p. 41. The point of the description of 
those tactics and allegations on pages 3 and 4 of Marvin's opening brief on appeal and the 
reference to Susan's claim that she had said nothing throughout the course of the action 
to present Marvin in an unfavorable light, Tr., Vol. I, p. 48, LL. 2 through 7, see page 7 of 
Marvin's opening brief, was to show the basis of the Magistrate's conclusion regarding 
Susan's responsibility for at least some of the "unkind and uncivil allegations" with which 
the Magistrate had to deal. 
Susan scheduled cosmetic surgery at the same time that she was claiming that she 
could not pay her attorney fees at trial. Tr., Vol. I, p. 50, L. 21 through p. 51, L. 24. Susan 
bought a motorcycle, made home improvements and took vacations when she claimed 
once again, just over a year later, that she still could not pay herfees., R., Vol. II, p. 13; pp. 
28 - 30. Susan's undisputed conduct belies her claim of need. As stated by Marvin in 
opposing Susan's renewed request for fees: 
"Affiant wishes to make clear that he does not fault [Susan] for taking 
vacations, making home improvements or buying a motorcycle. However, based 
on the fact that [Susan] has made such purchases since the trial of this action, 
affiant believes that [Susan] has had ample money since that trial to pay her 
attorney fees had that been a priority for her. Moreover, he does not see why he 
should pay [Susan's] costs and attorney fees while [Susan] spends her money for 
the items described in this affidavit." 
R., Vol. II, pp. 29 - 30. Under the circumstances, for the Magistrate simply to have 
observed, in an exercise of his discretion, based on an analysis of needand ability to pay, 
that the discrepancy of income cited by Susan was an insufficient justification for an award 
of attorney fees in this case, Tr., Vol. ll, p. 24, L. 18 through p. 25, L. 2 ,  appears to have 
been the kindest possible means of saying simply that she did not really need or deserve 
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the money. The Magistrate clearly acted within the bounds of his discretion in finding that 
Susan did not have the kind of "need" that justified an order that Marvin should pay her 
attorney fees, and this court should not overturn that finding by finding an abuse of 
discretion in this case. 
V. Marvin is Entitled to the Attorney Fees Incurred on Appeal, 
Both Before the District Court and Before This Court. 
The analysis offered in this brief demonstrates more forcefully than did the Opening 
Brief that Susan's appeal to the District Court was simply an invitation to second-guess the 
Magistrate's findings of fact, an invitation that the District Court accepted by reversing the 
Magistrate's conclusion as to the ownership of the building. It also demonstrates that the 
decision of the District Court was premised on the discovery of a new theory that Susan 
had not presented to the Magistrate and in support of which she had offered no evidence. 
It also shows that Susan's arguments to this court are simply advocacy of evidence already 
considered by the Magistrate and rejected by him. All of this clearly demonstrates that, at 
the most fundamental of levels, there never has been an issue of law involved in Susan's 
appeal. It always has been, purely and simply, a re-argument of the facts, which this court 
has repeatedly held to justify an award of attorney fees on appeal. That the District Court 
improperly granted Susan's request that he second-guess the Magistrate does not change 
the nature of her argument. This court should award attorney fees to Marvin on both levels 
of this appeal pursuant to ldaho Code Section 12-121 and Rule 41 of the ldaho Appellate 
Rules. 
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CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse the decision of the District Court, re-institute the 
judgment of the Magistrate in all respects and award Marvin the costs and attorney fees 
incurred on appeal pursuant to ldaho Code Section 12-121 and Rule 41 of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules 
DATED this lo th  day of February, 2009. 
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